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ABSTRACT
The expanding popularity of qualitative research, and more particularly case study re-
search, in the field of Information Systems, Organization and Management research,
seems to have been accompanied by an increasing divergence in the forms that this re-
search takes, and by recurrent criticisms concerning its rigor. This paper develops a heuris-
tic framework for guiding the design of a rigorous case study depending on the research’s
goal and epistemological framework, as well as for guiding its evaluation. It also highlights
the fundamental reasons – namely the epistemological ones – for differences in the guide-
lines offered in the literature for conducting high quality case studies.
In agreement with numerous authors, we argue for contingent evaluation criteria. We
supplement these authors’ works in two ways: (1) we consider various epistemological
frameworks that do not appear in the classifications that they use, especially including crit-
ical realism and pragmatic constructivism; (2) we propose a set of contingent criteria to be
used as a heuristic device for critically and knowledgeably building rigorous case studies
within different epistemological traditions.
Keywords: Qualitative research, case study, rigor, critical realism, pragmatic construc-
tivism.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les études qualitatives, et plus particulièrement les études de cas, se sont fortement diffu-
sées dans les recherches en systèmes d’information, organisation et management. Cette po-
pularité croissante s’est accompagnée d’une multiplication des formes possibles d’études de
cas, entrainant des critiques récurrentes quant à leur rigueur. Cet article propose des re-
pères heuristiques pour guider la réalisation d’études de cas rigoureuses et leur évaluation
en lien avec l’objectif et le cadre épistémologique de la recherche. Il souligne les raisons fon-
damentales, principalement d’ordre épistémologique, qui expliquent que des repères très
différents coexistent dans la littérature au sujet de la conduite d’études de cas rigoureuses.
À la suite de nombreux auteurs, nous argumentons en faveur de critères d’évaluation
contingents, adaptés au cadre épistémologique retenu pour conduire la recherche. Nous
complétons leurs travaux de deux manières. Nous considérons deux cadres épistémolo-
giques de plus en plus mobilisés dans les recherches mais encore peu discutés dans ces tra-
vaux : le réalisme critique et le constructivisme pragmatique. En outre, nous proposons une
mise en perspective des différents critères d’évaluation des recherches qualitatives en lien
avec le cadre épistémologique retenu, proposant ainsi un cadre heuristique pour construire
de façon critique, informée et raisonnée une étude de cas rigoureuse.
Mots-clés : Recherche qualitative, étude de cas, rigueur, réalisme critique, constructivisme
pragmatique.
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“Underlying any form of research is
a philosophy of science (…).
It is better to choose a philosophy
of science than to inherit one by
default.” Van de Ven (2007, p. 36)
INTRODUCTION
Although the amount of qualitative
research being performed has soared
over the last forty years, few qualitative
papers end up being published in top
tier academic journals such as MIS
Quarterly (MISQ), Organization Sci-
ence and Administrative Science Quar-
terly (ASQ). For instance, only 22 case-
study based papers were published
between 1995 and 2000 in AMJ, ASQ,
and SMJ (Gibbert et al., 2008), and
merely 10% of the articles published in
MISQ over the period 2011-2012 were
qualitative papers (Avison and Malau-
rent, 2013). Criticisms concerning the
rigor of qualitative research have ac-
companied its development (Weber,
2004; Gibbert et al., 2008; Pratt, 2009). 
There exist a wide variety of method-
ological approaches to qualitative re-
search. These include Grounded Theo-
rizing (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser,
2004; Charmaz, 2006); Ethnography
(Garfinkel, 1967; Suchman, 1987); Case
Studies (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Yin,
1989, 2009; Klein and Myers, 1999;
Dubé and Paré, 2003; Gioia, 2010,
2012; Wynn and Williams, 2012); De-
sign studies (Baskerville and Pryes,
1999; Carlsson, 2007; Denyer et al.,
2008; Pascal et al., 2013); Action Re-
search (Davison et al., 2012); and Criti-
cal Research (Myers and Klein, 2011). It
is difficult to classify these methods. In-
deed, a case study can be conducted
with methods close to ethnography
(Klein and Myers, 1999) or to grounded
theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Gioia
et al., 2012). There is also some overlap
between action research and design re-
search (Avison and Malaurent, 2013),
as well as between action research and
critical research (e.g. participatory ac-
tion research in Kemmis and McTag-
gart, 2008). However, these methods all
share the characteristic of being “small-
N studies” (Tsoukas, 2011). 
While this diversity of methods is a
source of richness (Avison and
Malurent, 2013), it is also a source of
confusion when it comes to deciding
how to conduct or evaluate a qualita-
tive research project in practice be-
cause of the multitude of justification
and evaluation guidelines. This multi-
tude of guidelines stems not only from
the diversity of methods but also from
the variety of philosophies of knowl-
edge – otherwise known as epistemo-
logical frameworks – in which these
methods can be carried out (Gephart,
2004 ; Mingers, 2004; Langley and
Royer, 2006 ; Smith, 2006; Yanow,
2006; Pratt, 2009). Indeed, any research
project takes place within an explicit or
implicit philosophy of knowledge (Van
de Ven, 2007). If the research method
mobilized is not consistent with, and
adapted to the research’s epistemologi-
cal framework, the research results will
be limited and superficial (Gephart,
2004), if valid at all.
To move forward, certain scholars
have offered guidelines that are specif-
ic to a particular epistemological
framework. For instance Eisenhardt
(1989, 1991), Yin (1989, 2009), and
Dubé and Paré (2003) for positivism
and post-positivism; Guba and Lincoln
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(1989), Klein and Myers (1999), and
Denzin and Lincoln (2003a, 2003b) for
interpretivism; Wynn and Williams
(2012) for critical realism; Avenier and
Parmentier Cajaiba (2012), and Albert
and Couture (2014) for pragmatic con-
structivism; and Myers and Klein
(2011) for critical studies.
However, these guidelines are gener-
ic and hence cannot be straightfor-
wardly applied. As noted by Pratt
(2009) there is no accepted “boiler-
plate” for writing up qualitative re-
search. So, in practice, there are still
strong critiques concerning the rigor of
qualitative research which have been
highlighted by the editors of top tier
journals in the fields of Information
Systems, Organization, and Manage-
ment research. For instance: “What is
new here?” (Gephart, 2004); “Findings
often appear to lack grounding in
data” (Gephart, 2004); “Methodology is
underspecified” (Gephart, 2004; Pratt,
2009); mistaking descriptive studies
and grounded theorizing (Suddaby,
2006); “Telling about data, not show-
ing it” or “Showing too much data, and
not interpreting it”, mixing guidelines
offered by various authors (such as, in
an example cited by Pratt (2009), striv-
ing to control for variance in an induc-
tive narrative study), and inappropri-
ately mixing inductive and deductive
strategies (Pratt, 2009); “Insufficient
theoretical contribution” (Ågerfalk,
2014). 
The purpose of this paper is to offer
insights that can help researchers nav-
igate various kinds of guidelines for
doing rigorous qualitative research in
Information systems, Organization,
and Management sciences. These in-
sights for adapting the chosen method
to the research’s specific context are
based upon a deep understanding of
knowledge goal and the justification
criteria in each epistemological frame-
work. In other words we aim to pro-
vide insights for using qualitative
methods critically and knowledgeably
within a context that makes different
assumptions (Mingers, 2001).
Given article length constraints, the
scope of this paper is limited to ad-
dressing the quality markers of only
one type of qualitative research, name-
ly the case study method. We focus on
this method for two main reasons: (1)
it is the qualitative method that is most
diffused in Information Systems, Orga-
nization and Management research,
and (2) it can take on very diverse
forms.
This paper is organized in three parts.
In the first part, we examine various
classifications of epistemological frame-
works and briefly describe the found-
ing assumptions of four solidly argued
epistemological frameworks that are
frequently mobilized in contemporary
research. In the second part, we dis-
cuss how case studies can be conduct-
ed and justified in each epistemological
framework. In the third part, we dis-
cuss the theoretical findings of this
methodological investigation, and in
the conclusion we draw their implica-
tions for (research) practice.
1. FOUNDING ASSUMPTIONS
OF CONTEMPORARY
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORKS 
Referring to Piaget’s (1967) definition
of epistemology as “the study of valu-
64
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able knowledge constitution”, we de-
fine an epistemological framework as a
conception of knowledge relying on a
set of mutually consistent founding as-
sumptions relative to the subjects that
epistemology addresses. Hence these
assumptions concern the origin and
nature of knowledge (epistemic as-
sumptions), how it is elaborated
(methodological assumptions), and
how it is justified. Most epistemologi-
cal frameworks also rely on founding
assumptions that concern what exists
(ontological assumptions). So-called
“truth theories of knowledge” depend
on epistemological frameworks and
are directly associated with the episte-
mological assumptions (Klein and
Myers, 1999; Sandberg, 2005; Boisot
and McKelvey, 2010). They specify
knowledge’s status and generation
goal.
1.1. A variety of classifications 
To date, there is no general agree-
ment among scholars on how to clas-
sify the epistemological frameworks
frequently mobilized in contemporary
research in Information Systems, Orga-
nization and Management sciences. A
traditional classification relies on a du-
alistic partition between positivism and
anti-positivism (Wicks and Freeman,
1998) or positivism and interpretivism
(Weber, 2004; Goldkul, 2008). Other
classifications distinguish between
foundational, quasi-foundational, and
non-foundational epistemological
frameworks (Amis and Silk, 2008); be-
tween various currents within interpre-
tivism and postpositivism (Cunliffe,
2011, in an updating of Morgan and
Smircich’s (1980) typology); between
positivism, interpretivism and critical
research (Orlikowski and Baroudi,
1991); between positivism, post-posi-
tivism, critical theory (and related the-
orizing), constructivism, and participa-
tory inquiry (Guba and Lincoln, 2007);
and between logical positivism, rela-
tivism, pragmatism, and realism (Van
de Ven, 2007). In the latter classifica-
tion, Van de Ven further distinguishes
between two different traditions within
realism, namely scientific realism and
critical realism. The critical realist
framework has been increasingly mo-
bilized over the past 10 years particu-
larly in IS research (see MISQ’s SI on
critical realism in IS research, 2013).
Amidst this lack of consensus, there
exist a number of epistemological
frameworks that rely on explicitly stat-
ed founding assumptions that are mu-
tually consistent and shared within var-
ious contemporary communities of
researchers. These epistemological
frameworks are those of positivism
and post-positivism, critical realism,
pragmatic constructivism, and interpre-
tivism. Because of the increasing diffu-
sion of these four epistemological
frameworks in Information Systems,
Organization, and Management re-
search we will concentrate on them in
the present paper. 
It is noteworthy that in contrast to
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), we do
not consider critical research (nor par-
ticipatory inquiry) as a philosophy of
knowledge that would stand on an
equal footing with positivism and in-
terpretivism (Orlikowski and Baroudi,
1991; Myers and Klein, 2011). Rather,
along with Rowe (2009), we view crit-
ical research as a methodological ap-
proach guided by a systematic inten-
65
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tion of critique of what, in an IS, may
hinder the blossoming of human po-
tential. It can be knowledgeably and
critically adapted to be conducted in
various epistemological frameworks
(Stahl, 2008 quoted by Rowe, 2009;
Guba and Lincoln, 2007; Rowe, 2009),
particularly those that posit both epis-
temic and ontological relativism, like
interpretivism (Rowe, 2009). Indeed,
for Myers and Klein (2011), it is easier
to bridge critical and interpretive re-
search than it is to bridge critical and
positivist research; more precisely, the
affinity between interpretive and criti-
cal research is much closer than that of
either one to positivist research.
In addition, given that the mobiliza-
tion of critical research in frameworks
that posit ontological realism is still
subject to caution, in this paper we
will solely discuss it in an interpretivist
framework.
1.2. Brief presentation
of the epistemological
frameworks considered
in this paper
The various epistemological tradi-
tions are presented in an ideal-typical
fashion: currents within each of these
traditions share core founding assump-
tions but may differ on certain nu-
ances. More precisely, the authors that
are cited do not necessarily have a uni-
form conception of the tradition to
which they are associated, particularly
in the interpretivist tradition as well as
in the positivist and post-positivist
ones. Moreover, as detailed in §1.2.3,
there is an important difference be-
tween the French and the English con-
structivist traditions, the French one
being associated with pragmatism and
the English one with social construc-
tivism (Lincoln and Lynham, 2011) and
post-modernism (Avenier, 2011).
1.2.1. Positivism
and post-positivism
Positivism posits ontological and
epistemic realism. More precisely it
posits the existence of an objective
world that can be described and repre-
sented in a direct mirror-like manner
(Gephart, 2013). As such, truth arises
from a correspondence between a
claim and empirically observed facts
(Boisot and McKelvey, 2010). 
Since Popper (1959), post-positivism
differs from positivism by criticizing
the role of induction wherein universal
laws could be derived from a set of
particular observations; hence, one can
only falsify, but not confirm, hypothe-
ses (Gephart, 2013). According to
Weber (2004), contemporary post-pos-
itivist researchers recognize the limita-
tion of the knowledge they seek to
build, understanding that their culture,
experience, history (and so on) impact
the research work they undertake and
thus their results. More recently, schol-
ars challenged this framework outlin-
ing that social sciences have to deal
with complex, messy interactive and
dynamic social processes characteriz-
ing human social behavior (Boisot and
McKelvey, 2010). Recognizing this
complexity directs the authors to a sci-
entific realist framework; in this frame-
work, exploration becomes crucial, ab-
ductive reasoning allows discovering
underlying patterns; justification of
knowledge resides primarily in its con-
tribution to efficacious adaptability and
66
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survival rather than to the attainment
of a predictive law-like truth (Boisot
and McKelvey, 2010). 
The diversity of currents within the
positivist and post-positivist traditions
generate richness. It also constitutes a
weakness because of the possible risks
of inconsistency within research pro-
jects carried out in this tradition (Smith,
2006). For example, the statistical tech-
niques used in positivism and post-
positivism for testing hypotheses are
not compatible with the assumption of
complex reality frequently made in IS,
Organization or Management research.
Indeed, these techniques rely on Gaus-
sian probability distributions. Those
are based upon an ontological as-
sumption of atomistic reality which
“assumes that human beings are au-
tonomous subjects, whose interests
and desires are transparent to them-
selves and independent from the inter-
ests and desires of others” (Calas and
Smircich, 1999, in Boisot and McK-
elvey, 2010: 418). This atomistic ontol-
ogy is not compatible with the as-
sumption of complex reality which
emphasizes interdependency (Boisot
and McKelvey, 2010). In a more gener-
al way Smith (2006), as a critical realist,
outlines that the positivist notion of
causality defined as the empirical con-
junction of events is inconsistent with
the experience of Information Systems
research. 
1.2.2. Critical realism
Critical realism has been developing
for some years from the foundational
work of Roy Bhaskar (1978). There has
been a growing interest, particularly in
the field of Information Systems
(Mingers et al., 2013). Indeed, an in-
creasing number of researchers argue
that critical realism could provide a co-
herent and robust underpinning phi-
losophy (Carlsson, 2007; De Vaujany,
2008; Mingers, 2004; Mingers et al.,
2013) and thus resolve some long
standing theory-practice inconsisten-
cies identified in research conducted
within the standard account of the
frameworks of positivism and interpre-
tivism (Smith, 2006). 
The term “critical realism” arose from
the combination of the terms “tran-
scendental realism” and “critical natu-
ralism” (Bhaskar, 1998a). As such, crit-
ical realism defends a strong realist
ontological assumption that posits that
there exists a world independent of
our knowledge (intransitive dimen-
sion); and even though it recognizes
the specificity and the emergent prop-
erties of the social realm, it asserts that
“social sciences can be sciences in ex-
actly the same sense as natural ones”
(Bhaskar, 1998a: xvii). At the same
time, critical realism accepts the rela-
tivism of knowledge (epistemic rela-
tivism – transitive dimension) which is
socially and historically constructed.
Nevertheless, epistemic relativity does
not mean judgmental relativity, i.e. that
all theoretical productions are equally
valid; once expressed theoretical pro-
ductions become available for investi-
gation and it is possible to eliminate al-
ternative explanations by empirically
testing their potential effects (Mingers,
2004).
In line with transcendental realism,
critical realism develops a stratified
conception of the world. More precise-
ly it posits that the real domain is com-
posed of generative mechanisms and
67
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structures, existing independently
from, but capable of producing pat-
terns of events that we observe; the ac-
tual domain is the domain in which
observed events occur; the empirical
domain is the domain of experienced
events (Bhaskar, 1978, 1998b). Gener-
ative mechanisms and structures have
emergent power, and whether this
power manifests or not depends on
the contextual conditions; in other
words, social structures have emergent
powers that are irreducible to those of
their constituent parts (Tsoukas, 1989).
Thus, causal explanation is not about
the deterministic association of pat-
terns of events but the activation (or
non-activation) of causal powers under
certain conditions (Tsoukas, 1989).
Here, researchers aim to know what
are the structures, the generative
mechanisms and the contextual condi-
tions responsible for the patterns of
events observed.
Finally, for Bhaskar (1998b) the
specificity of social sciences is that ob-
jects of social scientific inquiry only
ever manifest themselves in open sys-
tems; thus the absence of closed sys-
tems denies the possibility of decisive
test and prediction. This means that
criteria for the development of theories
in social sciences “must be explanatory
and non-predictive” (Bhaskar, 1998d,
p. 225).
1.2.3. Pragmatic constructivism
Piaget is the first author who intro-
duced the notion of “constructivist
epistemology” in 1967. Glasersfeld’s
(1984, 2001, 2005) radical construc-
tivism is in the direct lineage of Pi-
aget’s constructivism. Pragmatic con-
structivism is another name for radical
constructivism, which has also been
called “teleological constructivism” (Le
Moigne, 2001; Avenier, 2010) to under-
score the teleological character of the
knowledge process in this epistemo-
logical framework, a feature that Le
Moigne (1995) emphasizes in his re-
finements of Glasersfeld’s radical con-
structivism – and to which Le Moigne
fully subscribes. 
The qualifying term “pragmatic” has
been considered preferable to the
other two labels because it highlights
that, in this epistemological frame-
work, knowledge claims justification
and testing is performed in relation
with intentional actions these claims
are considered to illuminate (Avenier
and Parmentier Cajaiba, 2012). Hence
the term “pragmatic” is taken in its
philosophical sense, and particularly
the sense associated with the work of
the pragmatist philosophers William
James (1976/1912) and John Dewey
(1938). Consequently, pragmatic con-
structivism corresponds to the kind of
pragmatism that Ågerfalk (2010) sug-
gests exploring for design science, and
that Goldkuhl (2012) considers to con-
stitute an appropriate philosophy for
action research and design research. 
The term “pragmatic” has also been
considered preferable to that of “radi-
cal”, because the qualifying term “rad-
ical” sparked a certain amount of con-
fusion in the understanding of this
epistemological framework. Indeed, it
has often been interpreted to mean
that “[radical] constructivism denies re-
ality. But this it does not. It only denies
that we can rationally know a reality
beyond our experience” (Glasersfeld,
2001, italics in the original text). 
68
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In 2005, Glasersfeld explained why
he used the epithet “radical” for the
first time in 1974, in a contribution pre-
senting his interpretation of Piaget’s
constructivism: “It was intended in the
sense that William James (1976) [origi-
nally published in 1912] had used in
his radical empiricism, i.e., meaning
“going to the roots” or “uncompromis-
ing”. I chose it because at the time
many developmental psychologists
were mentioning Piaget’s construc-
tivism but without going into its epis-
temological implications. What they
called construction seemed to refer to
the fact that children acquire adult
knowledge not all at once, but in small
pieces. I did not think that this was a
revelation and therefore called their
approach “trivial constructivism””
(Glasersfeld, 2005, p. 10).
Hence Glasersfeld used the qualify-
ing term “radical” solely to differentiate
his conception of constructivism from
what he called a “trivial” conception of
constructivism, rather than from a pos-
sibly “moderate” conception of con-
structivism – as it is sometimes thought
or asserted (e.g. Van den Belt, 2003).
The epistemic assumption posited in
pragmatic constructivism – namely
that, in the knowledge process, what-
ever stems from the situation under in-
vestigation is inseparably intertwined
with whatever stems from the inquirer
– leads to epistemic relativism. As ex-
plained in §2.4.2 below, this epistemic
relativity does not mean that “anything
goes”.
A peculiarity of this epistemological
framework is that, because of the epis-
temic assumption it posits, and differ-
ently from all the other epistemologi-
cal frameworks, it refuses to posit any
founding ontological assumptions
(Glasersfeld, 2001; Avenier, 2010). In
particular, this makes the pragmatic
constructivist epistemological frame-
work fundamentally different from
Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) “construc-
tivist paradigm”2. Indeed, the latter
posits a founding ontological assump-
tion of “relativist ontology” which as-
serts the relative character of whatever
exists and hence attaches this
paradigm to post-modernism rather
than to pragmatism (Avenier, 2011).
This assumption, together with the
epistemic assumption it posits, makes
it judicious to classify Guba and Lin-
coln’s (1989) “constructivist paradigm”
in interpretivism, as Guba and Lincoln
themselves suggest in the following
statement: “The constructivist
paradigm also called the naturalistic,
hermeneutic, or interpretive paradigm
(with slight shadings in meaning)…”
(Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 83).
1.2.4. Interpretivism
Yanow (2006) depicts interpretivism
as an umbrella term subsuming differ-
ent schools of thought, including those
69
2 Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) “constructivist paradigm” is the conception of constructivism that is most dif-
fused in the English academic literature in IS, Organization and Management research, whereas in the
French academic literature in IS pragmatic constructivism is broadly diffused (Rowe, 2009) and Guba and
Lincoln’s conception is little known.
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drawing (explicitly or implicitly) on
phenomenology, hermeneutics, or
(some) Frankfurt School critical theory
(e.g. Habermas, 1972) along with sym-
bolic interactionism and ethnomethod-
ology, among others. This is in agree-
ment with Klein and Myers’ (1999) as
well as Sandberg’s (2005) views of in-
terpretivism, which underscore that
there are fairly different forms of inter-
pretivism. For instance (see Table 1 in
§1.3), at one extreme Sandberg’s
(2005) conception has significant over-
lap with pragmatic constructivism; at
the other extreme Guba and Lincoln’s
(1989) “constructivist paradigm” falls
within post-modernism (Avenier,
2011); Klein and Myers’ (1999) concep-
tion, which specifically focuses on in-
terpretive research of a hermeneutic
nature, occupies a sort of middle
ground.
Interpretive research can be more or
less critical in its “reading” of the social
world behind the words of the actors,
as a world characterized by power
structures, vested interests, and limited
resources to meet the goals of various
actors who construct and enact this so-
cial world (Klein and Myers, 1999).
All these diverse schools of thought
share a common phenomenological
base that stipulates that human and
world are inextricably related through
lived experience (Sandberg, 2005). In
particular, our knowledge of reality is
gained only through social construc-
tions such as language, consciousness,
shared meanings, documents, tools,
and other artifacts (Klein and Myers,
1999). Interpretive research attempts to
understand phenomena through the
meanings that people assign to them
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). It
posits social construction that reserves
agency to actors and, thereby, possibil-
ities of changes subject to various
kinds of constraints. Some authors
such as Sandberg (2005) posit the in-
tersubjective character of social situa-
tions to refer to the habits of thinking,
the ways of seeing and the shared
meanings among members of a group
who have been interacting over time,
which knit these people together. This
leads this author to posit that “the
agreed meaning constitutes the objec-
tive, intersubjective reality” (Sandberg,
2005, pp. 47-48).
1.3. Schematic overview
of the epistemological
frameworks’ founding
assumptions
Table 1 below offers a schematic
overview of the epistemological frame-
works’ founding assumptions. It is
based upon a variety of texts (Bhaskar,
1978 and 1998a, b, c, d; Guba and Lin-
coln, 1989; Orlikowsky and Bouroudi,
1991; Gephart, 2004; Boisot and McK-
elvey, 2010; Avenier and Gavard-Per-
ret, 2012…). 
The columns of Table 1 represent
ideal-types. Within each ideal-type,
there may exist diverse schools of
thought that introduce various nuances
and slight differences in certain as-
sumptions, particularly in positivism
and interpretivism. For instance, Guba
and Lincoln (2007) consider that the
only generalization possible in inter-
pretivism is descriptive generalization
whereas Klein and Myers emphasize
the goals of generalization in interpre-
tive research (Klein and Myers, 1999)
and of improvement of social theories
70
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in critical research carried out in an in-
terpretive framework (Myers and
Klein, 2011). 
The first two lines of Table 1 summa-
rize epistemic and ontological founding
assumptions that were discussed in
§1.2. So, in this section, we mainly
focus on Table 1’s last two lines. They
synthesize the specific nature of the
knowledge developed in each episte-
mological framework by specifying the
goal of the knowledge generation pro-
cess and the status of knowledge in
each framework. This enables us to
highlight that the goals of the knowl-
edge generation process differ across
the various epistemological frame-
works, and to draw the reader’s atten-
tion to the crucial importance of these
two aspects both for research and man-
agement practice. Indeed, on the one
hand, the research goal is what guides
the empirical study’s design as well as
the nature of the theoretical contribu-
tion. On the other hand, knowledge
status conditions the way the generated
knowledge can be used in IS, Manage-
ment and Organization practice.
Below in this section, we first specify
the goal of knowledge generation in
the various epistemological frame-
works, and then turn to the status of
generated knowledge in these frame-
works. 
In the positivist and post-positivist
traditions the science project aims to
record constant conjunctions of ob-
servable events (Mingers, 2013). As
such, the goal is mainly to identify sur-
face similarities and patterns between
various instances of the phenomenon
under study. In critical realism, the
goal is to identify underlying structures
and generative mechanisms that give
rise to the flux of phenomena under
study. The identification of generative
mechanisms is usually performed as a
two-step process: the first step aims at
inductively identifying patterns. The
second and main step consists of for-
mulating conjectures on the plausible
underlying generative mechanisms and
the contingent manner through which
they are activated, which would ex-
plain the observed patterns (Bhaskar,
1998c). To accomplish this, abduction
(also called retroduction, Bhaskar,
1998a) appears to be the most appro-
priate mode of reasoning (Mingers,
2004; Van de Ven, 2007; Boisot and
McKelvey, 2010). Thus theoretical ex-
planation proceeds by Describing the
significant features of the events,
Retroducing possible causes – i.e. gen-
erative mechanisms –, Eliminating pos-
sible alternative explanations and
Identifying the generative mechanisms
at work (the DREI process, Bhaskar,
1998a; Mingers, 2013). In pragmatic
constructivism, the goal is to intelligi-
bly build models that are functionally
fitted to experience and help to order
the domain of experience (Glasersfeld,
2001). This is basically achieved, as in
critical realism, through induction, ab-
duction and conceptual assimilation
(Glasersfeld, 2001; Le Moigne, 1995).
In interpretivism, the goal is to under-
stand how human beings make indi-
vidual and/or collective sense of their
particular world and engage in situa-
tions (Klein and Myers, 1999; Sand-
berg, 2005). This diversity of meanings
sometimes coalesces around consen-
sus (Guba and Lincoln, 2007). Another
possible goal is to attempt to relate
particulars identified in some context
to very abstract categories and con-
72
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cepts that can illuminate multiple situ-
ations (Klein and Myers, 1999; Sand-
berg, 2005).
The taxonomy of theory types pro-
posed by Gregor (2006) highlights that
the positivist and post-positivist tradi-
tion favors either prediction, or expla-
nation and prediction; critical realism
and pragmatic constructivism empha-
size explanation; and interpretivism
privileges analysis or explanation.
However, if each epistemological tradi-
tion aims more or less at building ex-
planations, the ways to build explana-
tions, to generalize them, and to use
them for acting are very different de-
pending on the epistemological frame-
work in which the research is conduct-
ed.
Concerning knowledge status, in the
positivist and post-positivist traditions
knowledge represents the world “as it
is”: the world and the knowledge of
the world “may be viewed as surfaces
whose points are in isomorphic corre-
spondence” (Bhaskar, 1998b, p. 19). 
In critical realism the status of
knowledge relative to generative
mechanisms is not fully decided. Some
authors adopt a correspondence con-
ception of generative mechanisms al-
though they admit that the verification
or falsification of this knowledge will
never be conclusive (Tsang and Kwan,
1999; Tsang, 2006). In this line, authors
acknowledge that a perfect match be-
tween theories and reality is unlikely,
resulting in a base of knowledge that is
fallible but presumably less so over
time (Wynn and Williams, 2012). In
other words, they search for an ap-
proximation of reality. Tsang (2006)
points out that the correspondence
conception of knowledge should only
concern the central assumptions of
theories. Other authors like Denyer et
al. (2008) and Pascal et al. (2013) favor
a pragmatic conception of knowledge,
focusing on what these generative
mechanisms do in the empirical world,
i.e. their observable effects. As noted
by Tsoukas (2000), one can never be
certain whether one has got into the
“nature” of an object of study, i.e. has
represented it as it is. 
In pragmatic constructivism, the con-
ception of knowledge is pragmatic:
knowledge has the status of plausible
interpretations that fit experience and
offer viable markers for intentionally
acting. More precisely, knowledge
does not pretend to reflect world-as-
possibly-functions; rather, it aims at of-
fering viable ways and means of acting
and thinking that allow one to attain
the goals one happens to have chosen
(Glasersfeld, 2001). Consequently, in
IS, Management, and Organization
practice, knowledge is to be used as
heuristic markers for thinking and act-
ing, rather than as offering precise
rules to be followed to the letter. It is
also used as a “sensitizing device” to
view the world in a certain way, ac-
cording to the phrase used by Klein
and Myers (1999) to depict the way
knowledge is used in interpretivism. 
In interpretivism knowledge has the
status of informed construction (Guba
and Lincoln, 1989) in which there is
agreement between the researcher’s
interpretation of the phenomenon
being studied and the meaning given
in lived experience by the individuals
involved in this phenomenon. This
agreement is progressively achieved
through an iterative process. 
73
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In critical research carried out in an
interpretivist framework, knowledge is
specifically used as heuristic markers
that guide transformative redefinitions
(Myers and Klein, 2011). 
Now that the conception of knowl-
edge in each of the four epistemolog-
ical frameworks considered in this ar-
ticle has been specified, we can
discuss how to develop valuable
knowledge in each of these frame-
works, limiting ourselves to the case
of a qualitative method that is widely
diffused in IS, Organization and Man-
agement research, but can take on
very diverse forms: the case study
method.
2. JUSTIFICATION OF CASE
STUDY QUALITY
IN CONTEMPORARY
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORKS 
After a short description of generic
principles and notions for case study
quality, we successively examine the
specific meanings taken on by the no-
tion of reliability, how internal quality
is justified, the goal of the theoretical
contribution, and the ways generaliza-
tion is performed and tested in case
studies carried out in the four episte-
mological frameworks considered in
this paper.
2.1. Generic notions
and principles for case study
quality
The quest for research quality is
based on generic notions and princi-
ples such as reliability, inferences qual-
ity, constructs quality and generaliza-
tion, which are fundamental in any re-
search project that intends to be
recognized as being rigorously con-
ducted (Gibbert et al., 2008). The spirit
of these principles holds regardless of
the research project’s epistemological
framework. However, their specific
meaning, and hence the way they are
justified and evaluated depend on the
research’s epistemological framework
(Amis and Silk, 2008; Avenier and
Gavard-Perret, 2012). For example, to
mark the difference of meanings that
the notion of reliability has in certain
frameworks, the term “reliability” is
sometimes replaced by “truthfulness”
(Sandberg, 2005), “trustworthiness”
(Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Schwartz-
Shea 2006) and/or by “credibility”
(Charmaz, 2006) in interpretivist
frameworks. We prefer to use the same
term of reliability for all the epistemo-
logical frameworks, but underscore
that this term takes on different mean-
ings in different epistemological frame-
works. 
Quality of inferences and constructs
depends on the rigor and the perti-
nence of the data collection and anal-
ysis. Construct quality is defined as the
ability to create clear classifications of
phenomena that structure experience
into meaningful categories (Suddaby,
2010). As such, construct quality is
first related to the quality of data col-
lection and inferences that progres-
sively allow the researcher to abstract
a construct from the data (Tsoukas,
2011). Second, it is also related to the
logical connections between the pro-
posed new construct and other exist-
ing constructs (Suddaby, 2010). In
74
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other words, researchers need to pre-
cisely indicate the literature from
which they are drawing and to which
they are contributing (Suddaby, 2010).
In any epistemological framework, re-
liability, and quality of inferences and
constructs require an explicit descrip-
tion of how the empirical material was
collected and all the operations per-
formed in relation with the empirical
material. The specific ways of building
quality in data collection and analysis
depend on the epistemological frame-
work.
Generalization – also called external
validity in the positivist and post-posi-
tivist frameworks – refers to knowl-
edge validity claims beyond the em-
pirical basis upon which these
knowledge claims have been elaborat-
ed. Qualitative research is often pre-
sented as more favorable than quanti-
tative research for elaborating
knowledge relevant for practice (Pratt,
2009). However, it is considered as
suffering numerous weaknesses when
it comes to justifying the validity of the
knowledge claims (Pratt, 2009), partic-
ularly generalizations made on the
basis of a single or even multiple case
studies (Gibbert et al., 2008). Indeed,
case study or small-N studies do not
allow generalization from the charac-
teristic of a sample to those of the cor-
responding population (in other
terms, statistical generalization). How-
ever, as noted by numerous scholars
(Tsoukas, 2011; Lee and Baskerville
2003; Tsang and Williams, 2012), gen-
eralization can take multiple forms.
Lee and Baskerville (2003) identified
four forms of generalization: from Em-
pirical statement to Empirical state-
ment (E/E), from Empirical statement
to Theoretical statement (E/T), from
Theoretical statement to Empirical
statement (T/E), and from Theoretical
statement to Theoretical statement
(T/T). Two forms of generalization
can be used by researchers doing case
study, echoing Klein and Rowe
(2008). First the results of a case study
can be generalized by abstraction
(type E/T generalization). In the posi-
tivist framework, the E/T generaliza-
tion is also called analytical general-
ization (Yin, 2009). It aims at clarifying
the theoretically necessary links be-
tween two or more characteristics of
the phenomenon studied in the case.
As we will see in more detail in the
following section, generalization
through abstraction for theory build-
ing can take different forms according
to the epistemological framework con-
sidered (Tsoukas, 2011). Second, re-
searchers can use case studies to gen-
eralize previous theory (type T/E
generalization), applying theoretical
concepts to different settings. As
noted by Tsang and Williams (2012),
this kind of generalization is closely
related to empirical testing. According
to the epistemological framework, this
empirical testing can confirm or falsify
insights in a replication logic or con-
tribute to refining extant theory in an
open-ended logic. In this later per-
spective, case studies offer “heuristic
generalization opportunities for refin-
ing our analytical understanding of
certain phenomena, namely opportu-
nities for making more incisive distinc-
tions than hitherto available”
(Tsoukas, 2011: 295). This shows the
strong links that connect generaliza-
tion and the research project’s main
purpose, be it theory-building, theory-
refinement or theory-testing.
75
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2.2. Conducting and justifying
the quality of (post-) positivist
case studies
2.2.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
In positivism and post-positivism,
there are various types of case study
for generating or testing theory. The
first type of case study is the one de-
scribed by Eisenhardt (1989, 1991); we
label this kind of method “exploratory
inductive” because it aims at identify-
ing surface patterns via inductive rea-
soning based upon multiple case stud-
ies, without specifically searching for
underlying explanations of these pat-
terns. The second type of case study is
deductive and is mainly used to test
theory (Dubé and Paré, 2003); thus we
prefer labelling this type of method,
which places a heavy emphasis on hy-
pothesis testing (Yin, 2009), “deductive
testing case study” rather than “ex-
planatory case study” as proposed by
Dubé and Paré (2003). 
These two kinds of case studies com-
bine within-case analysis with cross-
case analysis. As such, they favor mul-
tiple-case design (Dubé and Paré,
2003). Within-case analysis serves to
identify new concepts and/or new re-
lations between concepts. Then, repli-
cation of the study to various different
cases enables cross-case search for
patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540).
The goal is to show that the new rela-
tions observed under certain condi-
tions between concepts or categories
in the first cases studied are also ob-
served in the other cases under similar
conditions. Hence, here, replication
aims at verifying that the pattern initial-
ly identified holds across cases.
2.2.2. Justifying the quality
of “exploratory inductive”
or “deductive testing” case
studies
Reliability means subsequent re-
searchers will arrive at the same results
if they conduct the study again, using
the same steps. More precisely, reliabil-
ity concerns phenomena measurement;
measurement needs to be performed
with instruments (measurement scales,
questionnaires, etc.) that are reliable in
the following sense: measuring the
same phenomenon several times with
the same instrument should yield the
same results, independent of the per-
son using the instrument.
The keywords are transparency and
replication. The prerequisite for allow-
ing transparency and replication is
careful documentation and description
of how the entire case study has been
conducted. Two strategies are pro-
posed to ensure reliability: the use of a
case study protocol and the develop-
ment of a case study database (Yin,
1989, 2009; Dubé and Paré, 2003; Gib-
bert et al., 2008). A case study protocol
contains procedures and general rules
that should be followed in using the
diverse instruments (Dubé and Paré,
2003); combined with the data base,
the case study protocol allows replica-
tion and increases measurement relia-
bility.
Quality of inferences is related to the
data analysis process; researchers have
to provide a detailed description of the
analytical procedures followed (Ein-
senhardt, 1989; Dubé and Paré, 2003).
The key point is to maintain a logical
chain of evidence that allows an exter-
nal reviewer to follow the inferences
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made from raw material to ultimate
case study conclusions (Yin, 1989,
2009; Dubé and Paré, 2003). Cross-
coding aims at building analysis neu-
trality and objectivity and hence partic-
ipates in building research reliability.
On one hand, construct quality de-
pends on the formulation of a clear re-
search framework. For instance, for a
“deductive testing” case study, con-
struct quality depends on whether the-
ory triangulation – i.e. analyzing data
from different theoretical perspectives
(Yin, 2009) – has been performed; for
an “exploratory inductive” case study,
construct quality depends on whether
a clear a priori specification of con-
structs – without specifying the rela-
tions between them – guides the study
(Eisenhardt, 1989). On the other hand,
construct quality refers to the capacity
to build an accurate observation of the
reality (Gibbert et al., 2008). In posi-
tivist and post-positivist epistemologi-
cal frameworks, construct quality
mainly depends on the quantity, preci-
sion, and variety of data collected. Sev-
eral tactics are emphasized: multiple
data collection, mix of qualitative and
quantitative data, and data triangula-
tion (Dubé and Paré, 2003; Gibbert et
al., 2008).
Knowledge produced by case stud-
ies, more particularly “explorative in-
ductive” ones, is generalized via ab-
straction (E/T generalization, also
called analytical generalization). In an-
alytical generalization, researchers aim
at identifying the necessary theoretical
links between two or more observable
characteristics of the phenomena stud-
ied and specifying them in terms of a
broader theoretical scheme (Tsoukas,
2011). However, in positivist and post-
positivist frameworks, knowledge gen-
eralization is mainly performed with a
replication slant, via empirical testing.
Indeed, the principle of reproducibility
plays a central role in this epistemolog-
ical framework (Boisot and McKelvey,
2010). Since in the social sciences
identical replication through experi-
mentation is rarely possible, knowl-
edge claims external validity testing is
usually done via quantitative studies
that aim at testing various theoretical
hypotheses on samples representative
of the population to which the knowl-
edge claims have been generalized.
Nevertheless, qualitative methods can
be used to confirm or falsify theories
such as in “deductive testing” case
study. But in practice they are little
used with this aim: according to Dubé
and Paré (2003), it represents a mere
9% of 183 positivist case studies pub-
lished in seven major IS journals for
the period 1990 through 1999. Indeed,
concerning theory falsification, it can
always be argued that as theories are
simplifications, we are almost always
able to find instances in which a theo-
ry does not hold precisely; thus the dif-
ficulty is to convince the reader that
the case studied provides an important
insight provoking the violation of the
theory (Siggelkow, 2007). 
2.3. Conducting and justifying
the quality of critical realist case
studies
2.3.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
In critical realism, research methods
aim at developing, mainly via abduc-
tive reasoning (Mingers, 2004), specific
77
061-98 Avenier_projet  04/06/15  10:36  Page77
17
Avenier and Thomas: Finding one’s way around various methodological guidelines for do
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2015
SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT
conjectures on plausible generative
mechanisms underlying the phenome-
na being investigated. Case study is
thus presented as the best approach to
exploring the interaction of structure,
events, actions, and context in order to
identify and formalize causal mecha-
nisms (Wynn and Williams, 2012). We
have labeled these kinds of methods
“abductive explanatory” to differenti-
ate them from “exploratory inductive
methods” – which are concerned with
directly observable surface relation-
ships. Indeed, in abductive explanato-
ry methods, researchers are principally
interested in abductively finding expla-
nations for the events observed. 
Researchers can develop a single
case study, mainly for theory building
or a multiple case study for theory re-
finement. For instance, Tsoukas’ (1989)
abductive explanatory conception of
comparative cases study – which dif-
fers from Eisenhardt’s (1989) ex-
ploratory inductive one – aims at en-
riching the current view of generative
mechanisms and of the manner in
which they are activated, through a
comparative analysis of different con-
textual conditions. In critical realism,
comparative case studies shed light on
the specific contingent conditions
under which the postulated generative
mechanisms combine and operate
(Tsoukas, 1989).
2.3.2. Justifying the quality
of “abductive explanatory” case
studies 
In contrast with case studies carried
out in positivist and post-positivist
frameworks, in critical realism, social
phenomena are usually considered as
shaped by humans who act intention-
ally and can learn. This renders diffi-
cult reliably measuring social phenom-
ena. But this does not prevent scholars
from attempting to understand the un-
derlying reasons for their dynamics.
Besides, social phenomena are consid-
ered as taking place within open sys-
tems whose artificial closure for exper-
imentation purposes possibly
generates important perturbations.
This makes replication of social phe-
nomena difficult (Bhaskar, 1998b).
In critical realism – as well as in
pragmatic constructivism and interpre-
tivism – the principle of reliability
mainly concerns the cognitive path
that leads from the empirical material
through to the research results: re-
searchers have to give readers the
means to precisely follow the entire
cognitive path (Schwartz-Shea, 2006;
Charmaz, 2006). More precisely, re-
searchers have to show how they have
controlled and checked their interpre-
tations throughout the research pro-
cess, from formulating the research
question through analyzing the data
obtained and reporting the results
(Sandberg, 2005). In particular, they
have to explain the way the analysis –
particularly the coding – was per-
formed, as well as how the inferences
were drawn.
Quality of inferences refers to map-
ping out the pertinent configurational
patterns of the phenomenon studied
and trying to produce plausible expla-
nations for the similarities and differ-
ences observed (Tsoukas, 1989). Simi-
larities and differences are explained
by a combination of generative mech-
anisms and types of contingencies that
are responsible for their activation, in-
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volved in a particular setting. Building
a data structure as proposed by Gioia
et al. (2012) provides a graphic repre-
sentation of how researchers pro-
gressed from raw data to terms and
themes in conducting the analyses—a
key component of demonstrating relia-
bility and inferences quality.
Constructs consist of the structures,
the generative mechanisms and the
contextual conditions responsible for
the observed patterns of events. As
such, construct quality depends on the
explanatory power of the model elab-
orated (Glaser, 2004). The explanation
provided consists of the set of mecha-
nisms which interact to generate the
most accurate representation of the
empirical world given our existing
knowledge. Thus, it is possible and re-
quired to compare the explanatory
power of the model elaborated to al-
ternative theories (Wynn and Williams,
2012). Gioia et al. (2010) suggest that
one of the researchers can play the
role of the “devil’s advocate” by offer-
ing alternative explanations for devel-
oping findings. Finally, as in the previ-
ous tradition, construct quality also
depends on the quantity, precision,
and variety of data collected. The col-
lected data has to provide the detailed
aspects of events being studied and a
thick description of the structural enti-
ties, constituent parts, and contextual
conditions existing in the case (Wynn
and Williams, 2012). Data collection
also involves asking the actors why the
events under investigation have taken
place (Tsoukas, 1989).
In critical realism, generalization
concerns the degree of abstraction of
the explanatory model elaborated. In
this approach, generality is not seen as
a feature of the empirical domain but
as a property of the necessary relations
in structures operating in the real do-
main (Tsoukas, 2011). As such, “gener-
alization does not come from a move-
ment of empirical events in one
context to empirical events in a novel
context, but rather it results from the
uncovering of the underlying essence
of things, a movement from surface to
depth” (Smith, 2006; p. 205). Thus,
case studies are generalizable insofar
as they provide an explanation of the
causal powers which are at work and
are capable of generating the observed
phenomena (Tsoukas, 2011). 
The abstract explanatory model pro-
duced via case studies can be relent-
lessly modified and enriched through
testing it in qualitative research, per-
mitting continual comparisons with
more and more data (Glaser, 2004).
Various methods can be used, such as
comparative cases study (Tsoukas,
1989) and “design-oriented research”
(Denyer et al., 2008; Pascal et al.,
2013). This latter is used for testing
prior knowledge claims, like those de-
veloped in evidence-based manage-
ment. Such testing is performed within
comparative cases studies rather than
through replication, yet in a concep-
tion of scientific activity as “an ongoing
irreducibly empirical open-ended pro-
cess” (Bhaskar, 1998c, p xii). Nonethe-
less, since Tsang and Kwan’s seminal
work (1999), certain authors (Mingers,
2006; Miller and Tsang, 2010) have
strived to develop methods aimed at
enabling a form of replication that is
more modest than in post-positivist
frameworks. Indeed, in this epistemo-
logical framework, verification and fal-
sification cannot be definitive. Failure
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to replicate prior knowledge claims re-
garding structures or generative mech-
anisms in another context does not
constitute a falsification in Popper’s
sense, since this failure may be ex-
plained by contextual conditions or
counterbalancing generative mecha-
nisms (Tsang and Kwan, 1999).
2.4. Conducting and justifying
the quality of pragmatic
constructivist case studies
2.4.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
In pragmatic constructivism, knowl-
edge generation aims at conceptualiz-
ing researchers’ understanding of their
flux of experience about the phenome-
na they investigate. More precisely re-
searchers attempt to develop, particu-
larly through abduction and conceptual
assimilation (Glasersfeld, 2001), princi-
ples for organizing in an intelligible
fashion the regularities they perceive in
their flux of experience (Avenier and
Parmentier Cajaiba, 2012). So, as in the
case of critical realism, “abductive ex-
planatory case studies” are the most ap-
propriate kind of case studies in prag-
matic constructivism. In practice, the
main differences between knowledge
developed in these two epistemologi-
cal frameworks do not concern the
knowledge process, but knowledge
goals and status. 
Indeed, as already indicated above
(§1.3 and §2.3.1), in critical realism
knowledge aims at enriching the cur-
rent views of generative mechanisms
and of the contingent conditions under
which these generative mechanisms
operate; the status of knowledge is one
of correspondence regarding genera-
tive mechanisms and a pragmatic one
regarding the manner generative mech-
anisms are activated. In pragmatic con-
structivism, knowledge aims at enrich-
ing the current understanding of
researchers’ flux of experiences in their
contexts and the modelling of these
understandings (Le Moigne, 2007). The
status of knowledge is pragmatic in the
sense that these understandings and
modellings have to constitute viable
markers for intentionally acting in situ-
ations of the sort that these understand-
ings and modellings concern. 
Consequently, in the next section we
will not repeat the methodological ar-
guments developed for the justification
of “abductive explanatory case studies”
carried out in critical realism that also
hold in pragmatic constructivism. We
solely focus on the way these method-
ological arguments need to be adapted
or interpreted in pragmatic construc-
tivism where required, as well as on
methodological arguments that are
specific to this framework.
2.4.2. Specifically justifying
the quality of “abductive
explanatory case studies”
in pragmatic constructivism
The arguments developed in §2.3.2
for reliability justification in critical re-
alism straightforwardly hold in prag-
matic constructivism.
In pragmatic constructivism, the
quality of inferences depends on the
intelligibility and cogency of the rea-
soning used in building the model
from the empirical material. For in-
stance, in mapping out pertinent con-
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figurational patterns of the experience
of the phenomenon studied, and trying
to produce plausible explanations for
the similarities and differences per-
ceived. Perceived similarities and dif-
ferences are explained by a combina-
tion of modelling principles and types
of contextual conditions perceived to
prevail in a particular setting. Showing
a data structure as proposed by Gioia
et al. (2012) helps justifying reliability
and inferences quality.
In pragmatic constructivism, con-
structs consist of contextualized models
elaborated on the basis of a number of
extant modelling principles and theo-
rizations. Construct quality depends on
the model’s functional fit in the context
under consideration and viability for
acting in this kind of context (Glasers-
feld, 2001). Differently from critical re-
alism, the mobilization of alternative
theories serves to critically and knowl-
edgeably enrich constructs (Le Moigne,
1990) – rather than compare their re-
spective explanatory powers. Construct
quality also depends on the richness of
the empirical material gathered regard-
ing the processes involved in the phe-
nomenon under investigation, the con-
text of this phenomenon, the possible
individual and collective goals of the
actors involved in it, and background
information on the history of these pro-
cesses, and of their contexts and goals
(Le Moigne, 1990). 
As in critical realism, generalization
in pragmatic constructivism is concep-
tual: it goes from empirical material to
abstract statements and models. Gener-
alization is performed with the aim of
intelligibly organizing flux of experi-
ences in order to act intentionally in
various kinds of contexts. The empiri-
cal testing of these statements and
models is pragmatic. It is performed by
examining whether, in another context,
their re-contextualization according to
specificities of the new context pro-
vides functionally fitted and viable in-
sights for a goal-directed intervention
in the new context (Avenier, 2010).
When performed in case studies, this
pragmatic empirical testing consists of
examining whether the re-contextual-
ized knowledge provides functionally
fitted and viable markers for deciding
and carrying out a goal-directed inter-
vention in the situation under consider-
ation (Avenier and Parmentier Cajaiba,
2012). This testing cannot be solely ac-
complished by researchers, even those
acquainted with the setting, because
knowledge activation in a particular
setting demands local sense-making
and self-design by the practitioners in-
volved in the goal-directed intervention
(Tenkasi et al., 2007). As in critical real-
ism, failure of the model to offer viable
markers for acting in another context
does not constitute a falsification in
Popper’s sense but a signal that further
research needs to be carried out to un-
derstand the reasons for this failure
(Avenier and Gavard-Perret, 2012). This
can lead researchers to revise certain
underlying principles and adapt the
model accordingly. 
2.5. Conducting and justifying
the quality of interpretivist case
studies
2.5.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
Interpretive research of a hermeneu-
tic nature is the most diffused approach
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in interpretivist IS, Organization and
Management research. So, in this paper,
following Klein and Myers (1999) and
Sandberg (2005), we focus on interpre-
tivist case studies of a hermeneutic na-
ture. These case studies aim at under-
standing the worlds of situational actors
from their perspective, by describing
how these actors make individual and
collective sense of their particular
world. Hence we name them “interpre-
tive case studies”. These kinds of case
studies, among which we find the “nat-
ural inquiry” method (Lincoln and
Guba, 1985), explicitly draw on various
methodologies such as ethnomethodol-
ogy (Garfinkel, 1967), hermeneutic
methodology (Gadamer, 1976) and
phenomenography (Marton, 1981).
These methods are usually conduct-
ed in unique case studies (Dyer and
Wilkins, 1991; Sandberg, 2005). Re-
searchers provide “thick descriptions”
(Geertz, 1973; Schwartz-Shea, 2006) of
the context in which the meaning-
making and sense-making activities
under investigation took place, and a
narrative form of understanding based
upon the beliefs and desires of actors
(Bevir, 2006).
The main mode of reasoning in “in-
terpretive descriptive case studies” is
hermeneutic. Sometimes, these case
studies also offer insights on how the
processes of interpretation, meaning-
making and engagement in situation
possibly operate.
2.5.2 Justifying the quality of
“interpretive case studies” 
The following discussion is mainly
based on Klein and Myers’ (1999) and
Sandberg’s (2005) conceptions of re-
search quality in interpretivism, which
complement each other. Indeed Klein
and Myers’ (1999) keywords for char-
acterizing research quality are plausi-
bility and cogency, whereas Sandberg
(2005) specifically discusses reliability
and validity criteria. These criteria can
appear more readily usable to certain
researchers than Klein and Myers’ prin-
ciples for improving the plausibility
and cogency of interpretive accounts –
even though, like Klein and Myers’
(1999) principles, the use of these cri-
teria requires considerable creative
thinking. 
First, we briefly recall Klein and
Myers’ seven principles. Then we
show how Sandberg’s criteria connect
to these principles, which are as fol-
lows:
1. The principle of the hermeneutic
circle suggests that all human under-
standing is achieved by iterating be-
tween considering the interdependent
meaning of parts and the whole that
they form. This principle of human un-
derstanding is fundamental to all the
other principles.
2. The principle of contextualization
requires that the subject matter be set
in its social and historical context. It is
noteworthy that the spirit in which this
is done differs from a positivist ac-
count of history. 
3. The principle of interaction be-
tween the researcher and the subjects
requires critical reflection on how the
research materials (or “data”) were so-
cially constructed through the interac-
tion between the researchers and par-
ticipants.
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4. The principle of abstraction and
generalization. Even though interpre-
tive research is idiographic, intrinsic to
interpretive research is the attempt to
relate particulars to very abstract cate-
gories. This abstraction process is
sometimes called “descriptive general-
ization” (Guba and Lincoln, 2007).
5. The principle of dialogical reason-
ing requires sensitivity to possible con-
tradictions between the theoretical
preconceptions guiding the research
design and actual findings (“the story
which the data tells”) with subsequent
cycles of revision. 
6. The principle of multiple interpre-
tations requires sensitivity to possible
differences in interpretations among
the participants. 
7. The principle of suspicion requires
critical thinking and “reading” the so-
cial world behind the words of the ac-
tors, a social world that is character-
ized by power structures, vested
interests, and limited resources.
Sandberg’s (2005) criteria are based
upon the conception of truth as “inten-
tional fulfillment” that holds in inter-
pretivism. Intentional fulfillment means
that there is agreement between the
researcher’s interpretation of the phe-
nomenon being studied and the mean-
ing given by research participants in
lived experience. Sandberg (2005)
views intentional fulfillment as a “truth
constellation” that comprises various
aspects that complement each other.
He derives from this truth constellation
three validity criteria to be used itera-
tively, namely communicative, prag-
matic and transgressive validity crite-
ria.
Communicative validity focuses on
meaning coherence, stipulating that in-
terpretations should be made coherent
with the empirical material constituted
and investigated. The principle of co-
herence is based upon the hermeneu-
tic circle and requires implementing an
iterative process where conflicting in-
terpretations can be judged with re-
spect to how coherent they are with
the empirical material. Hence commu-
nicative validity is directly connected
to Klein and Myers’ (1999) principles 1,
2, 3 and 5. 
Pragmatic validity addresses the
issue of possible discrepancy between
what people say they do and what
they actually do. Building pragmatic
validity involves searching for such
possible discrepancy by asking follow-
up questions that constantly embed
the statements in concrete situations,
or through participant observation.
Hence communicative validity is di-
rectly related to Klein and Myers’
(1999) principles 6 and 7. Sandberg
(2005) underscores that the most ex-
tensive way to check interpretations is
testing them in practice, but this often
requires a separate study in which the
findings are re-contextualized into the
practice being investigated. This view,
which is not present in Klein and
Myers’ principles, brings Sandberg’s
conception of interpretivism closer to
pragmatic constructivism than to Guba
and Lincoln’s (1989) interpretivism. 
Transgressive validity draws the re-
searcher’s attention to possible irre-
solvable contradictions and tensions,
which may be overlooked in the quest
for communicative and pragmatic va-
lidity. Hence it is directly connected to
Klein and Myers’ principle 6. By sys-
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tematically looking for differences and
contradictions rather than coherence in
lived experience, this criterion chal-
lenges and complements the criterion
of communicative validity. 
For Sandberg (2005), the principal
question of reliability is about achiev-
ing interpretations truthful to lived ex-
perience where truth is conceived as
intentional fulfillment. Given this con-
ception of truth, criteria of reliability,
such as replicability and interjudge re-
liability of results relating to objective
reality, fall outside the domain of inter-
est in achieving reliability within inter-
pretivist approaches. Instead, the pro-
posed truth constellation implies first
and foremost that researchers must
show how they controlled and
checked their interpretations through-
out the research process, i.e. how they
dealt with their subjectivity. Acknowl-
edging subjectivity does not mean ac-
cepting ‘biased subjectivity’ that occurs
for instance when one principally
takes note of statements that support
one’s opinions, selectively interprets
statements so one can justify one’s
own conclusions, and tends to ignore
counter evidence.
To sum up, Klein and Myers’ (1999)
principles for interpetivist case study
quality and Sandberg’s (2005) reliabili-
ty and validity criteria are mutually
consistent. They also complement
each other. Indeed, Klein and Myers
highlight abstraction and descriptive
generalization, whereas Sandberg pre-
cisely specifies the notion of reliability
in interpretivist research, and high-
lights the importance of “thick descrip-
tions” (Geertz, 1973) and treating all
the aspects of the lived experience
under investigation as equally impor-
tant – in particular, giving equal voice
to all individuals involved. In addition,
Sandberg (2005) suggests the possibil-
ity of pragmatically testing descriptive
generalizations, which is fairly unusual
in interpretivist guidelines and situates
his conception of interpretivist re-
search closer to pragmatic construc-
tivist research than most other concep-
tions.
2.5.3. Focus on interpretivist
critical case studies
Because of the particular relevance
critical research has in IS research, we
think it is important to briefly discuss
critical case studies. One difficulty is
that of substantial diversity within the
critical research philosophy: there is
no single coherent theoretical founda-
tion (Myers and Klein, 2011). Howev-
er, all critical studies share two charac-
teristics: they rely on a strong
theoretical base that includes taking a
value position and a critical stance to-
wards the way things are, and they
offer suggestions on the way things
could be that would bring improve-
ments to society (Myers and Klein,
2011). Since critical research shows
similarities with interpretivist research
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991), con-
centrating on critical case studies con-
ducted in the framework of interpre-
tivism makes sense and permits one to
develop a fairly consistent view of
these kinds of case studies. Hence, in
this section we focus on the specific
principles and criteria for quality of in-
terpretivist critical case studies which
apply beyond the generic ones that
apply for interpretivist case studies in
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general – which were discussed in the
previous section. 
The two features evoked above that
are specific to critical studies have sev-
eral consequences on the research de-
sign of critical interpretivist case stud-
ies. Particularly, data collection and
analysis are organized around core
concepts from critical social theorists;
and researchers subject the value posi-
tion they take to continual critical re-
flection, as well as the concept they
mobilize. In particular researchers en-
gage in challenging prevailing assump-
tions, beliefs, values and practices that
are often taken for granted, with po-
tentially conflicting arguments and evi-
dence. The special features of critical
case studies also condition the kind of
knowledge that is generated, namely
knowledge oriented toward facilitating
the realization of human needs and
potential, critical self-reflection and as-
sociated self-transformation, i.e. foster-
ing participants’ reflexivity (Rowe,
2009), as well as individual emancipa-
tion, improvements in society and in
social theories (Myers and Klein,
2011). In other words, the knowledge
generated is not limited to interpretive
descriptions. It also suggests how
things could be, given the constraints
associated with the current circum-
stances – for instance how unwarrant-
ed uses of power might be overcome
(Myers and Klein, 2011). 
Myers and Klein (2011) underscore
that although data collection and anal-
ysis are supposed to be organized
around the core concepts from one or
more critical social theorists, this does
not mean that these concepts should
remain unchallenged or that new ones
might not emerge. Rather, the theoret-
ical apparatus mobilized should be
subject to change, partly in response to
new historical discoveries or empirical
data on current social changes, and
partly in response to new theoretical
reasoning and debate. Indeed, critical
theorists believe that our theories are
fallible and that improvements in so-
cial theories are possible through cri-
tique and debate. Theory testing is ac-
complished in critical case studies
through the use of theory as a “sensi-
tizing device” to view the world in a
certain way (Myers and Klein, 2011).
Differently from the situation in prag-
matic constructivist case studies, the
social transformations and the emanci-
patory actions suggested in a critical
case study do not constitute a means
to pragmatically test the knowledge
that has been generated in the study.
These transformative actions are ends
in themselves. All this suggests that in
IS especially, some critical research
should be seeking to improve socio-
technical theory (Myers and Klein,
2011). 
2.6. Synthesis Table
Table 2 synthesizes the insights of-
fered throughout §2 on how to design
and conduct rigorous case studies
within each of the four epistemological
frameworks considered in the article.
The column “Interpretivism” also high-
lights specific quality principles of in-
terpretivist critical case studies, which
apply beyond those referring to inter-
pretivist case studies in general. 
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3. DISCUSSION
This discussion is organized around
three main points. First, we highlight
the commonalities and differences be-
tween quality principles in two episte-
mological frameworks that are located
in the epistemic transition zone (John-
son et al., 2006), namely critical real-
ism and pragmatic constructivism.
Then we discuss the importance of ex-
plicitly inscribing any single research
project in an epistemological frame-
work, and, in the third point, argue
that the multiplicity of epistemological
frameworks mobilized in the disci-
plines considered in this article pro-
vides richness to each of these disci-
plines.
3.1. Main commonalities
and differences between critical
realism and pragmatic
constructivism
In this paper we have considered
four epistemological traditions: posi-
tivism and post-positivism, critical real-
ism, pragmatic constructivism, and in-
terpretivism. This classification has two
main advantages. First, it combines the
various possible combinations be-
tween assumptions of ontological real-
ism vs. ontological relativism (OR vs.
ORel) on the one hand, and epistemic
realism vs. epistemic relativism (ER vs.
ERel) on the other one. Indeed, posi-
tivism and post-positivism posit
(OR/ER), critical realism (OR/ERel),
pragmatic constructivism (-/ERel), and
interpretivism (ORel/ERel); and the
combination of ontological relativism
with epistemic realism does not make
sense. Secondly, this classification
takes into account two growing episte-
mological traditions that occupy an in-
termediary position between posi-
tivism and interpretivism: critical
realism and pragmatic constructivism.
To further understand these two tradi-
tions located in the epistemological
transition zone (Johnson et al., 2006),
we wish to emphasize their main com-
monalities and differences.
As seen before, critical realism posits
ontological realism together with a
stratified conception of reality and at
the same time, accepts the relativism of
knowledge. Pragmatic constructivism
has the following property: for the
sake of framing a particular research
project conducted in this epistemolog-
ical framework, scholars have the pos-
sibility of taking any beliefs concerning
the possible nature of the world (that
are consistent with their experience of
that world) as working assumptions,
particularly the critical realist ones or
the interpretivist ones. The only condi-
tion is to explicitly state these working
assumptions at the start of the project,
define a research design consistent
with them, and recall them when pre-
senting the research results (Avenier,
2010). This opening creates possible
overlaps between research done in
pragmatic constructivism and critical
realism or interpretivism. 
As highlighted by Table 2, the meth-
ods for knowledge generation and for
empirically testing generalizations ap-
pear fairly similar in critical realism
and pragmatic constructivism. Howev-
er, even though knowledge claims can
be developed with similar methods,
the differences in these frameworks’
ontological founding assumptions in-
duce differences in the status of
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knowledge in these two frameworks.
In critical realism, knowledge aims at
describing the (postulated) deep reali-
ty as-is, and hence concerns ontology:
knowledge developed about genera-
tive mechanisms is supposed to de-
scribe how these (postulated) genera-
tive mechanisms function in various
contexts. The higher the conceptual
level of knowledge about generative
mechanisms, the deeper the level of
reality where these generative mecha-
nisms are located. In pragmatic con-
structivism, conceptual knowledge
does not pretend to provide an iconic
description of whatever possibly ex-
ists; rather it aims at offering intelligi-
ble and functionally fitted models to
viably deal with the world of experi-
ence. Hence it concerns flux of expe-
riences rather than ontology. 
This difference in knowledge status
induces important differences in the
way knowledge can be used in prac-
tice. Since the knowledge developed
in critical realism is supposed to pro-
vide plausible explanations of how the
world functions, it offers solidly-ar-
gued grounds upon which to make de-
cisions for intervening adequately in a
situation, taking into account the role
of the contexts in generative mecha-
nisms’ activation. Thus, the knowledge
developed in critical realism does not
provide law-like rules but heuristic
propositions based upon the explana-
tory power of generative mechanisms.
In pragmatic constructivism, knowl-
edge does not pretend to provide de-
scriptions of how the world functions,
but functionally fitted and viable mod-
els for dealing with the world of expe-
rience. These models are to be used as
heuristic markers supporting open re-
flections and discussions on how to
adequately intervene in a situation. 
3.2. The importance of explicitly
inscribing any single research
project in an epistemological
framework 
In this paper, we have shown that
the goal of theory-building and the
form of research results depend on the
research’s epistemological framework,
and that the validity of research results
can only be justified in reference to a
certain vision of what is knowledge,
i.e. in reference to an epistemological
framework. So, in this respect, our
contribution is in agreement with a
number of authors’ views, such as
Klein and Myers (1999), Gephart
(2004), Sandberg (2005), Johnson et al.
(2006), Amis and Silk (2008) and East-
erby-Smith et al. (2008), as well as with
those of Morgan and Smircich (1980),
Cunliffe (2011) and Keutel et al.
(2014). We supplement these authors’
works in two ways: (1) we consider
various epistemological frameworks
that are not discussed in the classifica-
tions that they use; (2) for every epis-
temological framework considered in
the current paper, we exhibit some key
markers to help researchers rigorously
conduct case study research.
In the main body of the paper, we
have argued that the validity of re-
search results depends on the fit be-
tween the method effectively imple-
mented and the research project’s
epistemological framework. However,
we highlighted that the relationship
between kind of research method and
kind of epistemological framework is
not a one-to-one relationship. For in-
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stance, as seen above, case study can
be used to generate knowledge in very
different epistemological frameworks.
But when researchers want to mobilize
this kind of method, they have to im-
plement it in fairly different ways, de-
pending on the epistemological frame-
work of the research project. Providing
researchers with this crucial informa-
tion and explanations would consider-
ably help them to make sound
methodological decisions and further-
more, foster overall improvement of
quality of qualitative research in a plu-
ralistic field. As such, we participate in
increasing authors’ as well as review-
ers’ general understanding of different
epistemological traditions. This consid-
erably helps authors locate and make
explicit their own underlying philo-
sophical assumptions and be informed
as to how case studies ought to be
shaped and judged depending on the
tradition to which they subscribe (East-
erby-Smith et al., 2008; Keutel et al.,
2014). Therefore, the proposed contin-
gent “criteriology” (Johnson et al.,
2006) synthetized in Table 2 consti-
tutes a heuristic device to critically and
knowledgeably use case study within
different epistemological traditions,
echoing Mingers (2001) recommenda-
tions.
From this perspective, this article
provides some guidelines for increas-
ing methodological diversity particular-
ly in doing case study, but not at the
expense of rigor. Indeed, a deep un-
derstanding of the quality criteria cor-
responding to the epistemological tra-
dition in which the research is
conducted allows researchers to mind-
fully explore different possible design
alternatives and to sometimes try new
designs in order to capture the most of
this research strategy’s potential (Keu-
tel et al., 2014).
3.3. The multiplicity of epistemo-
logical frameworks as a richness
for the disciplines
Even though we have just argued
that it is essential to inscribe any single
research project in an explicit episte-
mological framework, and even
though any individual researcher prob-
ably feels more inclined to inscribe
their research projects in a particular
epistemological framework and use a
particular research method, this does
not mean that we consider that any of
the disciplines of IS, Organization, and
Management sciences should sub-
scribe to one and only one epistemo-
logical framework. 
On the contrary, along with numer-
ous scholars (e.g. Myers and Klein,
2011, and Hassan, 2014 in the IS field),
we consider that pluralism is essential
in these disciplines. Indeed, “pluralism
is not problematic; quite the opposite,
it speaks to the very vitality of the field
of organizational studies” (Amis and
Silk, 2008, p. 475). Pluralism in philo-
sophical, theoretical and methodologi-
cal positions is a great asset to these
disciplines (Romme et al., 2015, forth-
coming). “Using different theory-build-
ing approaches to study disparate is-
sues is a better way of fostering more
comprehensive portraits of complex
organizational phenomena” (Gioia and
Pitre, 1990). 
Gioia and Pitre’s (1990) notion of
meta-paradigm perspective amounts to
considering that Mingers’s (2001) view
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according to which methods can be
detached from the epistemological
frameworks in which they have initial-
ly been developed, and critically and
knowledgeably used within a context
that makes different assumptions, also
applies to the use of knowledge itself.
This means that in any research pro-
ject, it may be possible to integrate el-
ements developed in another episte-
mological framework, albeit not in an
arbitrary manner (Myers and Klein,
2011), but critically and knowledge-
ably – i.e. by reinterpreting them ac-
cording to the founding assumptions
of the epistemological framework in
which knowledge integration takes
place. Indeed, any meta-paradigm per-
spective is nonetheless rooted in a spe-
cific paradigm, that to which the re-
searcher subscribes (Gioia and Pitre,
1990). 
This is precisely what Denyer et al.
(2008) propose to do for developing
design propositions through research
synthesis in a critical realist framework.
In the same spirit, Romme and Van
Burg (2014) offer a critical realism-affil-
iated methodological framework for
research synthesis in entrepreneurship
which fosters reflectively integrating
knowledge developed in positivist, in-
terpretive, and pragmatic epistemolog-
ical frameworks.
CONCLUSION
The expanding popularity of qualita-
tive research, and more particularly
case study, in the fields of Information
Systems, Organization and Manage-
ment research, seems to have been ac-
companied by an increasing diver-
gence in the forms that it takes (John-
son et al., 2006). In this paper we have
developed a heuristic framework for
guiding the design of a rigorous case
study depending on the research’s goal
and epistemological framework. This
framework can also provide guidance
to reviewers in their evaluations. We
have also highlighted the fundamental
reasons – namely the epistemological
ones – for differences in the guidelines
offered in the literature for conducting
high quality case studies. As such, we
propose a set of contingent criteria to
be used as a heuristic device to critical-
ly and knowledgeably build rigorous
case studies within different epistemo-
logical traditions following Mingers’
(2001) recommendations. In line with
Keutel et al. (2014) we argue for more
mindfulness regarding the design and
accomplishment of case studies.
Naturally, we recognize that evalua-
tion criteria are historically and socially
constructed philosophical conventions.
Especially, they express competing jus-
tificatory logics to control the disci-
pline’s formal evaluation system, deter-
mining what constitutes valid
knowledge (Sandberg, 2005). Never-
theless, identifying these conventions
and rendering them explicit is crucial
to understanding how to legitimize a
particular research project in a certain
epistemological framework, to critical-
ly and knowledgeably use methods
(Mingers, 2001), and to suggest the use
of specific evaluation criteria (Johnson
et al., 2006). Moreover, embracing and
articulating different sets of epistemo-
logical assumptions could function as a
means of communication between
schools of thought, and may serve to
empower mutual understanding
91
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through dialogue with, and receptive-
ness to the philosophical assumptions
of others (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
Last but not least, this study has im-
portant implications for research prac-
tice. First, from the very start of a re-
search project, specify its
epistemological framework. We have
emphasized that underlying any form
of research there is a philosophy of
knowledge – otherwise known as an
epistemological framework. However,
the underlying philosophy of knowl-
edge remains more often implicit than
explicit. Nowadays, since various
solidly-argued epistemological frame-
works are available, it is important to
choose one deliberately when under-
taking research, rather than to inherit
one by default (Van de Ven, 2007).
Second, researchers need to be mind-
ful to maintain the internal consistency
of the research design, particularly
consistency between the epistemologi-
cal framework, the goal of research
(namely, theory building, theory re-
finement or theory testing) and the im-
plemented method. Finally, it is advis-
able to focus submissions on academic
journals open to the research episte-
mological framework. 
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